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CVE

RUSTSEC-2026-0335

Pre-shared key mode transmits the TGK in cleartext, exposing the SRTP master key
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CVE

RUSTSEC-2026-0335

Pre-shared key mode transmits the TGK in cleartext, exposing the SRTP master key

mykey implements MIKEY (RFC 3830) for SRTP key exchange. Pre-shared key mode

transmitted the TEK Generation Key (TGK) in the clear.

MikeyMessage::newpskinit built its KEMAC payload with EncAlg::Null and

placed the TGK in enc_data verbatim. Anyone able to read a PSK-Init message

therefore recovers the TGK — and so the SRTP master key — **without knowing the

pre-shared key**.

The transmitted value was never even used by the receiver: complete_psk

re-derived the TGK from the pre-shared key and ignored enc_data entirely. The

field was write-only; it provided nothing and disclosed everything.

A second consequence: the message authentication key was derived from the TGK

rather than from the pre-shared key, so an attacker who read the TGK off the wire

could also forge a valid message MAC. Integrity was lost along with

confidentiality. That aspect is tracked separately as GHSA-xq78-wvcv-hqvj.

Exploitability

A MIKEY message is normally distributed as an SDP a=key-mgmt:mikey attribute,

which in AES67 and SMPTE ST 2110 deployments is typically announced over SAP

multicast. A passive listener on the media network recovers the session key with

no active attack and no credentials.

RFC 3830 §4.2.3 permits NULL encryption only where "the underlying protocols can

guarantee security", and warns to use it with caution. An SDP file or a SAP

announcement is not such a channel.

The fix

Pre-shared key mode now follows RFC 3830 §3.1 as key transport: the initiator

generates a random TGK, frames it as a Key data sub-payload (§6.13), and encrypts

it with AES-CM (§4.2.3) under an encryption key and 112-bit salt derived from the

pre-shared key (§4.1.4). The message MAC is keyed from the pre-shared key and

verified before anything is decrypted.

This changes the wire format, so both ends of an exchange must be upgraded

together. The incompatibility is silent: an old peer and a new peer complete the

exchange without error and then derive different SRTP keys.

Workarounds

Use ephemeral Diffie-Hellman mode instead of pre-shared key mode, or carry the

PSK-Init only over a channel that is already confidential and authenticated end

to end.

Package Versions Affected

Package Version
patch Availability
No items found.

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CVSS Version

Severity
Base Score
CVSS Version
Score Vector
C
H
U
-
C
H
U
0
-
3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
C
H
U
-

Related Resources

No items found.

References

https://crates.io/crates/mykey, https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0335.html, https://github.com/waxspin/mykey/pull/25

Severity

9.1

CVSS Score
0
10

Basic Information

Base CVSS
9.1
EPSS Probability
0%
EPSS Percentile
0%
Introduced Version
0.0.0-0
Fix Available
2.0.0

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