Get a Demo

Let's Patch It!

Book a short call with one our specialists, we'll walk you through how Endor Patches work, and ask you a few questions about your environment (like your primary programming languages and repository management). We'll also send you an email right after you fill out the form, feel free to reply with any questions you have in advance!

CVE

RUSTSEC-2026-0334

BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses
Back to all
CVE

RUSTSEC-2026-0334

BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses

Affected versions of bip322 accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an

attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim

P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in

applications using verify_simple, verifysimpleencoded, verify_full, or

verifyfullencoded as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address.

In verify_full, the verifier obtained the public key from the

caller-controlled witness and passed it to verifyfullp2wpkh, where the

supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and

compared it with itself:

let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1];
if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key {
    return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch);
}

Since pub_key was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this

comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid

for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this

public key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322's requirement

that the message_signature satisfy the message_challenge (the claimed

address's scriptPubKey).

As a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH

address, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign

it with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No

victim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do

not mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and sign the current

challenge message with their own key.

P2TR verification is not affected: the public key is derived from the

address's witness program rather than from the caller-controlled witness.

The flaw was corrected in commit

e8accbe

by deriving the expected scriptPubKey from the witness public key

(P2WPKH(HASH160(pubkey)), wrapped in P2SH for the nested case) and

requiring it to exactly equal the scriptPubKey of the claimed address before

signature verification, failing with Error::PublicKeyMismatch otherwise.

The fix is included in version

0.0.11. Affected versions 0.0.6

through 0.0.10 have been yanked from crates.io.

There is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to

version 0.0.11 is the recommended course of action.

Package Versions Affected

Package Version
patch Availability
No items found.

Automatically patch vulnerabilities without upgrading

Fix Without Upgrading
Detect compatible fix
Apply safe remediation
Fix with a single pull request

CVSS Version

Severity
Base Score
CVSS Version
Score Vector
C
H
U
-
C
H
U
0
-
3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
C
H
U
-

Related Resources

No items found.

References

https://crates.io/crates/bip322, https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0334.html, https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/bip322/commit/e8accbe7d39f48f030e44f333b4796e28f6aad80

Severity

9.1

CVSS Score
0
10

Basic Information

Base CVSS
9.1
EPSS Probability
0%
EPSS Percentile
0%
Introduced Version
0.0.6
Fix Available
0.0.11

Fix Critical Vulnerabilities Instantly

Secure your app without upgrading.
Fix Without Upgrading