DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90042

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers  The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However, the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages, which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc(). The various callers of cephfnametousr() directly pass (slices of) raw messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms (see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer).  Make cephfnametousr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using tname (which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any inappropriate addresses to fscryptfnamedisktousr().  Additionally change parsereplyinforeaddir() -- the only function to supply its own tname -- to follow the new "tname must never come from vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce buffer in parsereplyinforeaddir() and use that as tname instead.