CVE-2026-89634

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop

The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd ("smb/client: fix possible

infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()") compared the post-ALIGN

length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow:

for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8)

wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop

advances by zero bytes leaving 'p' pointing into stale data.

Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space

before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after.  Since raw_len is

bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check

is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.