DEBIAN-CVE-2026-64268

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length  In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siwqprx.c, siwprocrresp() places each inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siwchecksge() resolves and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem) branch), and siwrrespcheckntoh() compares the cumulative length against wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->moreddpsegs guard).  A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink buffer; the next siwrxdata() call writes out of bounds at sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP, so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs no local privilege.  Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siwprocsend() and siwproc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the Read Response would overrun the sink buffer.  This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case, because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer.