CVE-2026-64269

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdmawritesg

When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdmawritesg() builds the source

scatter/gather entry for the IBWRRDMA_WRITE that returns data to the

peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:

  plist->length = le32tocpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);

rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via

RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrssrvrdmadone() -> processio_req() ->

process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this

change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed

chunk start (dmaaddr[msgid]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide

localdmalkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs

layer does not constrain the transfer length to maxchunksize. msg_id

and off are bounded against queuedepth and maxchunk_size in

rtrssrvrdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not

checked against the chunk size.

A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than maxchunksize can make

the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting

behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in

passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk

and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a

translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort

the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol

permits and is driven by a remote peer.

Reject a descriptor length above maxchunksize, mirroring the existing

off >= maxchunksize bound in rtrssrvrdma_done(). Legitimate clients

do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is

capped at the negotiated maxiosize (maxchunksize - MAXHDRSIZE).