CVE-2026-48086

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANTADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBALADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the GLOBAL_ADMIN enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that "only an existing GLOBALADMIN may grant GLOBALADMIN", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.