CVE-2026-13214

The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocppj.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parsegetconfigmsg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON "key" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIGOCPPRECVBUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).

The GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocppwsreader() reads the message into ui->recvbuf and dispatches it to parsegetconfigmsg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose "key" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.

The consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers.