GHSA-jfwg-rxf3-p7r9

Vulnerability Details

CWE: CWE-943 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic

All 66+ CQL queries in internal/storage/db/cassandradb/ use fmt.Sprintf to interpolate user-controlled values directly into CQL query strings without parameterization.

Unauthenticated endpoints (signup, login, forgot_password, magiclinklogin) pass user input directly into CQL query strings.

Note: This advisory covers the Cassandra CQL injection only. The Couchbase N1QL injection is tracked in a separate advisory per CVE rule 4.2.11.

Affected Code Pattern

// Before (VULNERABLE) - e.g. cassandradb/user.go
query := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT ... FROM %s WHERE email = '%s'", table, email)
err := p.db.Query(query).Scan(...)

Steps to Reproduce

1. Deploy Authorizer <= 2.0.0 with Cassandra backend
2. Send a signup request with a CQL injection payload in the email field:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/graphql \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query":"mutation { signup(params: { email: \"test'\" }) { message } }"}'

1. The single quote breaks out of the CQL string literal, causing a CQL parse error that leaks internal schema information
2. Crafted payloads can manipulate query logic to bypass authentication or extract data

Affected Files (10 Cassandra files)

| Package | File | Queries Fixed |

|---------|------|--------------|

| cassandradb | user.go | 7 |

| cassandradb | otp.go | 4 |

| cassandradb | session_token.go | 19 |

| cassandradb | verification_requests.go | 4 |

| cassandradb | authenticator.go | 3 |

| cassandradb | email_template.go | 5 |

| cassandradb | webhook.go | 5 |

| cassandradb | webhook_log.go | 2 |

| cassandradb | session.go | 1 |

| cassandradb | env.go | 2 |

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary CQL operators through the email, phone, or token parameters on public-facing endpoints (signup, login, forgotpassword, magiclink_login). This enables authentication bypass and data exfiltration from the Cassandra keyspace.

Proposed Fix

Use parameterized queries:

// After (FIXED)
query := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT ... FROM %s WHERE email = ?", table)
err := p.db.Query(query, email).Scan(...)

Fixed in https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/pull/500 (merged 2026-03-27).