CVE-2026-47065

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy   Assessment: Fully addressed.   When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker  for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()  is dispatched. JDK then calls the default  ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which  performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH  interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted  classes list .   ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in  readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes   Assessment: Fully addressed.   For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s   (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an  attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the  developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies  com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many  real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers   Both issues have been fixed.