CVE-2026-47065

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

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Assessment: Fully addressed.

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When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker 

for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()

 is

dispatched. JDK then calls the default 

ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which 

performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH 

interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted

 classes list .

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ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in 

readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

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Assessment: Fully addressed.

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For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s 

 (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an 

attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the 

developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies 

com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many 

real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers

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Both issues have been fixed.