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CVE

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw

pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies
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CVE

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw

pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. 

This affects:

  • HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
  • Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
  • Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

  • A server that returns different tarball content on each request
  • malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
  • victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

  • Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
  • Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
  • Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

Package Versions Affected

Package Version
patch Availability
No items found.

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CVSS Version

Severity
Base Score
CVSS Version
Score Vector
C
H
U
7.5
-
3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
C
H
U
0
-
3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
C
H
U
7.5
-
3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Related Resources

No items found.

References

https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263, https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85, https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm

Severity

7.5

CVSS Score
0
10

Basic Information

Ecosystem
Base CVSS
7.5
EPSS Probability
0.00018%
EPSS Percentile
0.03627%
Introduced Version
0,0.0.0-20230605-20230605142810
Fix Available
10.26.0,1010.0.0

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