CVE-2025-68697

Impact

In self-hosted n8n instances where the Code node runs in legacy (non-task-runner) JavaScript execution mode, authenticated users with workflow editing access can invoke internal helper functions from within the Code node.

This allows a workflow editor to perform actions on the n8n host with the same privileges as the n8n process, including:

• Reading files from the host filesystem (subject to any file-access restrictions configured on the instance and OS/container permissions)
• Writing files to the host filesystem (subject to the same restrictions)

Starting with n8n version 1.2.1, access to files in the n8n home directory (.n8n) is blocked by default. However, this does not restrict access to other parts of the filesystem unless additional file access limitations are configured.

Patches

• Upgrade to n8n version 2.0.0 or later, where task runners are enabled by default for Code node execution.
• On n8n version 1.71.0 and above, enable task runners by setting N8NRUNNERSENABLED=true.

Workarounds

If you cannot immediately migrate to task runners:

• Limit file operations by setting N8NRESTRICTFILEACCESSTO to a dedicated directory (e.g., ~/.n8n-files) and ensure it contains no sensitive data.
• Keep N8NBLOCKFILEACCESSTON8NFILES=true (default) to block access to .n8n and user-defined config files.
• If workflow editors are not fully trusted, consider disabling high-risk nodes (including the Code node) using NODES_EXCLUDE.

Resources

• n8n Docs: Task runners
• n8n Docs: Task runner environment variables
• n8n Docs: Security environment variables
• n8n Docs: v2.0 breaking changes